Moderating government

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0901-8MaRDI QIDQ892851zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris, Giovanna Iannantuoni

Publication date 12 November 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• A Theory of Divided Government
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• Electing a parliament

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Divided Government
• Electing a parliament
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

Cited in

(4)

• Moderation of an ideological party
• A purely non-cooperative model of divided government
• Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
• Fairness and voting

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