On the political economy of compulsory education

DOI10.1007/S00712-021-00735-XMaRDI QIDQ2058505zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alessandro Balestrino, Lisa Grazzini, Annalisa Luporini

Publication date 9 December 2021

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00735-x

zbMATH Keywords

redistributive taxationprobabilistic votingeducation policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

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Cites work

• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Das Human-Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure
• Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence
• Multistage public education, voting, and income distribution
• On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies

Cited in

(5)

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• CHILD LABOR AND THE EDUCATION OF A SOCIETY
• Child labor and compulsory education: the effects of government education policy on economic growth and welfare
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• Preferences, social capital, and compulsory volunteering

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