Lobbying: influence under micro-targeting

DOI10.1007/S00355-025-01594-XMaRDI QIDQ6844244zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Priyanka Joshi

Publication date 16 March 2026

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-025-01594-X

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information

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