A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1040.0334MaRDI QIDQ3115461zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anthony M. Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, Dave Porter, Christine Demartini

Publication date 21 February 2012

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80271/

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscombinatorial auctionsexperimental economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Polyhedral combinatorics, branch-and-bound, branch-and-cut (90C57) Experimental studies (91A90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(32)

• A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions
• Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
• Non-linear anonymous pricing combinatorial auctions
• Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
• Pricing combinatorial auctions.
• A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes
• Boolean networks-based auction algorithm for task assignment of multiple UAVs
• The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• Combinatorial clock auctions: price direction and performance
• Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
• Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
• Combinatorial auctions
• Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
• Pricing combinatorial auctions by a set of linear price vectors
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• Modeling the Pre Auction Stage The Truckload Case
• Benefits of inter-firm relationships: application to the case of a five sawmills and one paper mill supply chain
• Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
• A parametrization of the auction design space
• Request evaluation strategies for carriers in auction-based collaborations
• Coordination of manufacturing and engineering activities during product transitions
• Scheduling with package auctions
• Design for optimized multi-lateral multi-commodity markets
• When speed is of essence: perishable goods auctions
• BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
• An efficient bidding heuristic for simultaneous truckload transportation auctions
• On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
• Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction

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