Pricing combinatorial auctions by a set of linear price vectors

DOI10.1007/s00291-016-0430-6zbMath1349.91116OpenAlexW2296301239MaRDI QIDQ331786

Jenny Nossack, Dirk Briskorn, Kurt O. Jørnsten

Publication date: 27 October 2016

Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-016-0430-6

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionsnonlinear anonymous pricingset of linear prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Block order restrictions in combinatorial electric energy auctions
• Non-linear anonymous pricing combinatorial auctions
• Pricing combinatorial auctions.
• A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes
• The package assignment model.
• Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
• Integer Programming and Pricing
• Reflections about pseudo-dual prices in combinatorial auctions
• Integer programming duality: Price functions and sensitivity analysis
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Strict linear prices in non-convex European day-ahead electricity markets

This page was built for publication: Pricing combinatorial auctions by a set of linear price vectors