Pricing combinatorial auctions by a set of linear price vectors
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Publication:331786
DOI10.1007/S00291-016-0430-6zbMATH Open1349.91116OpenAlexW2296301239MaRDI QIDQ331786FDOQ331786
Authors: Dirk Briskorn, Jenny Nossack, Kurt Jörnsten 
Publication date: 27 October 2016
Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-016-0430-6
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
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- Integer Programming and Pricing
- Reflections about pseudo-dual prices in combinatorial auctions
- Combinatorial auctions
- Integer programming duality: Price functions and sensitivity analysis
Cited In (5)
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