Stochastic evolutionary game analysis between special committees and CEO: incentive and supervision

DOI10.1007/s13235-020-00372-xzbMath1480.91028OpenAlexW3106894098MaRDI QIDQ2062247

Kangkang Lin, Hongkun Zhang, Xinmin Liu, Lei Wang

Publication date: 27 December 2021

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-020-00372-x

zbMATH Keywords

incentivegovernance strategyspecial committeestochastic evolutionary gamesupervisory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of stochastic analysis (to PDEs, etc.) (60H30) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

• Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination
• Technology-sharing strategy and incentive mechanism for R\&D teams of manufacturing enterprises
• Costly participation and the evolution of cooperation in the repeated public goods game
• Metastability in stochastic replicator dynamics
• Stochastic differential games: a sampling approach via FBSDEs
• Poverty alleviation ecosystem evolutionary game on smart supply chain platform under the government financial platform incentive mechanism
• Exponential stability in \(p\)-th mean of solutions, and of convergent Euler-type solutions, of stochastic delay differential equations

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