Robust trading mechanisms (Q1087124)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3986983
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| English | Robust trading mechanisms |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3986983 |
Statements
Robust trading mechanisms (English)
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1987
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We consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information. It is shown that posted-price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy. A posted-price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade.
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trading institution
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single buyer and seller
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private information
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posted-price mechanisms
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dominant strategy
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0.852393627166748
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0.8376874923706055
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0.8329997658729553
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0.8210498690605164
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0.8148434162139893
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