Changing behaviour under unfairness: an evolutionary model of the ultimatum game

DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2023.109078MaRDI QIDQ6570302zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gianni Arioli, Roberto Lucchetti, G. Valente

Publication date 10 July 2024

Published in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2023.109078

zbMATH Keywords

dynamical evolutionevolutionary game theoryfairnessrational behaviour

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37)

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Cites work

• An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
• Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous ultimatum game
• Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• The chain store paradox
• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations

Cited in

(1)

• Evolution and the ultimatum game

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