Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules

DOI10.1016/0895-7177(89)90416-0zbMATH Open0691.90001OpenAlexW2097589584WikidataQ59765458 ScholiaQ59765458MaRDI QIDQ583067FDOQ583067

Authors: Gary W. Cox 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(89)90416-0

Recommendations

• Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
• Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
• Introduction to the theory of voting
• Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto dominationvoting rulesballotscovering dominationdomination of candidatesjust dominationplurality domination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A new definition of a Stieltjes integral

Cited In (4)

• Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
• Asymmetric policy effects, campaign contributions, and the spatial theory of elections
• Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
• Being Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place in an Election – Voter Deterrence by Deletion of Candidates

This page was built for publication: Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q583067)