Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.

DOI10.1016/S0895-7177(03)80003-1MaRDI QIDQ1410900zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors H.-H. Bock, W. H. E. Day, F. R. McMorris

Publication date 15 October 2003

Published in Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0895-7177(03)80003-1

zbMATH Keywords

collective choicemanipulabilityrulevote concentrationvoting scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections
• An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
• Attainable results in committee elections.
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences

Cited in

(7)

• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• Attainable results in committee elections.
• Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
• On stable rules for selecting committees
• Winner determination and manipulation in minisum and minimax committee elections
• A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections

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