An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
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(21)- Electing a committee with dominance constraints
- Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
- Multi-winner rules analogous to the plurality rule
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- On the rule of \(k\) names
- Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
- A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection
- Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
- It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree
- How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
- Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- Popular spanning trees
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
- Voting and vagueness
- Coincidence of Condorcet committees
- Condorcet winning sets
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