A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes

DOI10.2307/1910411MaRDI QIDQ3048532zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Salvador Barberà

Publication date 1979

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1910411

zbMATH Keywords

decision schemesgroup strategy-proofnessmanipulationmisrepresentingpreference analysissocial choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(13)

• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Salvador Barberà
• Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
• Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers
• Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
• How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
• The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
• Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
• Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness

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