College admissions with tuition transfers

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.006zbMATH Open1484.91306OpenAlexW4206369480MaRDI QIDQ2078089FDOQ2078089

Authors: Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan 

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.006

Recommendations

• Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
• Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College admissions with affirmative action
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymatchingstabilitystrategy-proofnessmechanismtuition transfer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Two-sided matching with indifferences
• Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints

Cited In (2)

• Graduate admission with financial support
• Untangling the Tuition Exchange program network

This page was built for publication: College admissions with tuition transfers

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2078089)