Information compression in dynamic games
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Cites work
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- Game theory
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- Microeconomic theory
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- On delayed sharing patterns
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- On the relations between the values of a game and its information structure
- Optimal control of Markov processes with incomplete state information
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- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- Sequential decision processes with essential unobservables
- Sequential Equilibria
- Stochastic games
- Stochastic Games
- Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
- Sufficient statistics in the optimum control of stochastic systems
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- The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
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- The Optimal Control of Partially Observable Markov Processes over the Infinite Horizon: Discounted Costs
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
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