Small improving coalitions and small group effectiveness

DOI10.1111/J.1742-7363.2013.12010.XzbMATH Open1416.91027OpenAlexW1914294387MaRDI QIDQ4583965FDOQ4583965

Myrna Wooders

Publication date: 29 August 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12010.x

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zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriumcooperative gamecoresmall group effectivenessequal treatmentsmall group negligibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (1)

• Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores

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