The core of large differentiable TU games

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2810zbMath1005.91014OpenAlexW1973259784MaRDI QIDQ5958893

Larry G. Epstein, Massimo Marinacci

Publication date: 20 March 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2810

zbMATH Keywords

exchange economylarge gamenonatomic game core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (6)

A characterization of the core of convex games through Gâteaux derivatives ⋮ Subcalculus for set functions and cores of TU games. ⋮ Preference for knowledge ⋮ Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects. ⋮ The Burkill-Cesari integral on spaces of absolutely continuous games ⋮ A mesh-based notion of differential for TU games

Cites Work

• Symmetric upper probabilities
• Convex functions, monotone operators and differentiability
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications
• Cores of exact games. I
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Values and Derivatives
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion
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