The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00786-6zbMATH Open0880.90016WikidataQ127015002 ScholiaQ127015002MaRDI QIDQ1361893FDOQ1361893

Authors: Benyamin Shitovitz, Shlomo Weber 

Publication date: 5 February 1998

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

Lindahl equilibriacontinuum economyabstract stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Theory of games and economic behavior.
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Core equivalence with congested public goods
• Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics
• A Tiebout theorem
• A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
• The optimistic stability of the core mapping in public goods production economies
• The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets

Cited In (4)

• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
• General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies

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