Democratic public good provision
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.07.013zbMATH Open1280.91067OpenAlexW2097821127MaRDI QIDQ2370495FDOQ2370495
Authors: Kjetil Storesletten, Fabrizio Zilibotti, John A. A. Hassler
Publication date: 26 June 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.013
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multiple equilibriaredistributionpublic goodpolitical economyMarkov equilibriumRamsey taxationrepeated voting
History, political science (91F10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Public goods (91B18)
Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The political economy of environmental policy with overlapping generations
- Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable
- A second chance at success: a political economy perspective
- Democratic public good provision
- Generational distribution of fiscal burdens: a positive analysis
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