On the Possibility of "Fair" Collective Choice Rule
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Publication:3929489
DOI10.2307/2526281zbMath0473.90006OpenAlexW2003399315MaRDI QIDQ3929489
Publication date: 1981
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526281
fairnessaxiomatic characterizationcomplete characterizationextended sympathy social choice frameworkfair collective choicefairness- as-no-envy approachGoldman-Sussangkarn rule
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