No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0657-3zbMATH Open1288.91074OpenAlexW2126617212MaRDI QIDQ2452239FDOQ2452239

Authors: Norihito Sakamoto 

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/19289/070econDP11-08.pdf

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• To Envy or To Be Envied? Refinements of the Envy Test for the Compensation Problem
• On fair compensation
• Efficiency first or equity first? Two principles and rationality of social choice
• Weak path independence
• On the concept of fairness
• On Pareto-efficiency and the no-envy concept of equity
• Some implications of an intensity measure of envy
• On the Possibility of "Fair" Collective Choice Rule
• A refinement and extension of the no-envy concept
• Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off
• No-envy and Arrow's conditions

Cited In (2)

• No-envy and Arrow's conditions
• Choice functions and weak Nash axioms

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