No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality
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Publication:2452239
DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0657-3zbMath1288.91074OpenAlexW2126617212MaRDI QIDQ2452239
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/19289/070econDP11-08.pdf
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Cites Work
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