A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1897330
DOI10.1007/BF01238776zbMath0831.90045MaRDI QIDQ1897330
Pier Luigi Sacco, Angelo Antoci
Publication date: 18 February 1996
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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On the persistence of corruption, Optimal dynamic law enforcement, Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics
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