An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.107zbMATH Open1253.91135OpenAlexW2135002957MaRDI QIDQ1925656FDOQ1925656

Authors: Uwe Kratzsch, Gernot Sieg, Ulrike Stegemann 

Publication date: 18 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31977/1/MPRA_paper_31977.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

global warminginternational agreementweak renegotiation-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Renegotiation in repeated games
• A climate agreement with full participation
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control

Cited In (1)

• A climate agreement with full participation

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