Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
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Publication:714788
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2012.05.018zbMATH Open1259.91033OpenAlexW2017843071MaRDI QIDQ714788FDOQ714788
Authors: Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman 
Publication date: 11 October 2012
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2012.05.018
Recommendations
Applications of game theory (91A80) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)
Cites Work
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Algorithms, games, and the internet
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Combinatorial agency
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
- The cost of moral hazard and limited liability in the principal-agent problem
- Combinatorial agency of threshold functions
- Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency
Cited In (12)
- Targeting in networks under costly agreements
- The complexity of contracts
- Optimal sequencing of contract algorithms
- Combinatorial agency
- Optimal contracts for outsourced computation
- A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
- Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency
- Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
- Combinatorial agency of threshold functions
- Multi-agent contracts
- Learning approximately optimal contracts
- Computational principal-agent problems
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