Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
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Publication:3095267
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_12zbMATH Open1233.91199OpenAlexW2126137945MaRDI QIDQ3095267FDOQ3095267
Authors: Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Christina Lee, Anthony Chong, Adam Wierman, B. Hassibi 
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/54115/
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Cited In (7)
- Friendship and stable matching
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
- Stable matching with network externalities
- Welfare Effects of Dynamic Matching: An Empirical Analysis
- Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
- Empathetic decision making in social networks
- Stability in matching markets with peer effects
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