Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_12MaRDI QIDQ3095267zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Christina Lee, Anthony Chong, Adam Wierman, B. Hassibi

Publication date 28 October 2011

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/54115/

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Stability in matching markets with peer effects
• Stability in dynamic matching markets
• Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
• Robust stability in matching markets
• Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
• Agreement toward stability in matching markets
• Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
• Stable matching with network externalities
• Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

Cited in

(7)

• Friendship and stable matching
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• Stable matching with network externalities
• Welfare Effects of Dynamic Matching: An Empirical Analysis
• Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
• Empathetic decision making in social networks
• Stability in matching markets with peer effects

This page was built for publication: Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3095267)