Minimizing envy and maximizing average Nash social welfare in the allocation of indivisible goods
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Publication:477331
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2014.09.010zbMath1307.91107OpenAlexW2080780366MaRDI QIDQ477331
Trung Thanh Nguyen, Jörg Rothe
Publication date: 3 December 2014
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2014.09.010
Related Items (9)
Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items ⋮ Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods ⋮ An additive approximation scheme for the Nash social welfare maximization with identical additive valuations ⋮ Exact solution approaches for integer linear generalized maximum multiplicative programs through the lens of multi-objective optimization ⋮ Fair and efficient allocation with few agent types, few item types, or small value levels ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Nash Social Welfare, Matrix Permanent, and Stable Polynomials ⋮ Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings ⋮ Fair in the Eyes of Others
Uses Software
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