The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets

DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2003.08.008zbMath1165.91433OpenAlexW2152734194MaRDI QIDQ1029018

Gerhard J. Woeginger, Martin Skutella, Sándor P. Fekete

Publication date: 9 July 2009

Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2003.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitymathematical economicseconomic equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• On the complexity of equilibria
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets