On the complexity of market equilibria with maximum social welfare
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3894789 (Why is no real title available?)
- A path to the Arrow-Debreu competitive market equilibrium
- Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
- Finite solution of pure trade markets with Cobb-Douglas utilities
- Leontief economies encode nonzero sum two-player games
- Market equilibrium via the excess demand function
- Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
- New complexity results about Nash equilibria
- On the complexity of price equilibria
- On the polynomial time computation of equilibria for certain exchange economies
- The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets
- The spending constraint model for market equilibrium: algorithmic, existence and uniqueness results
Cited in
(10)- Market equilibria with hybrid linear-Leontief utilities
- Core pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: computational hardness and algorithmic solutions
- The Complexity of Non-Monotone Markets
- The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets
- On the computational complexity of the maximum trade problem
- Recent development in computational complexity characterization of Nash equilibrium
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5697111 (Why is no real title available?)
- The complexity of equilibria: Hardness results for economies via a correspondence with games
- On the complexity of price equilibria
- Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
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