The spending constraint model for market equilibrium: algorithmic, existence and uniqueness results
DOI10.1145/1007352.1007431zbMATH Open1192.91101OpenAlexW2036174679MaRDI QIDQ3581007FDOQ3581007
Authors: Nikhil R. Devanur 
Publication date: 15 August 2010
Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1007352.1007431
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