REMARKS ON A PROCEDURAL CONDITION FOR THE VOTING PARADOX

DOI10.1111/BOER.12193zbMATH Open1429.91151OpenAlexW2942122231WikidataQ127963694 ScholiaQ127963694MaRDI QIDQ5213481FDOQ5213481

Authors: Susumu Cato 

Publication date: 3 February 2020

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12193

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zbMATH Keywords

voting paradoxsocial choicedecisivenesscycle social preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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