A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.009zbMath1347.91121OpenAlexW2299001664MaRDI QIDQ274071

Dominique Lepelley, Issofa Moyouwou, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 22 April 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.009

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser

Cites Work

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• The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
• Electoral systems. Paradoxes, assumptions, and procedures
• Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
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• The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
• On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives
• Two Algorithms for Determining Volumes of Convex Polyhedra

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