From Black’s Advice and Arrow’s Theorem to the Gibbard–Satterthewaite Result

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_1zbMath1331.91074OpenAlexW2221759580MaRDI QIDQ2787393

Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 25 February 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision Library C (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Unsettling aspects of voting theory
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