Progressive and robust scoring rules: axiomatic taxonomy

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103282MaRDI QIDQ7364432zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Guy Barokas, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date 2 October 2026

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103282

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
• Borda rule and Arrow's independence condition in finite societies
• Majority-approval social choice
• Measuring Attitudes Towards Inequality
• On the Measurement of Polarization
• Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
• Unequal inequalities. I, II

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