Conditions on preferences that guarantee a simple majority winner†

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1972.9989805zbMath0252.90066OpenAlexW2047227877MaRDI QIDQ5666413

Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1972

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1972.9989805

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (2)

SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ Intrinsic Limitations of the Majority Rule, an Algorithmic Approach

Cites Work

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• Transitive Multi-Stage Majority Decisions with Quasi-Transitive Individual Preferences
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• Intransitive Individual Indifference and Transitive Majorities

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