Rational inattention when decisions take time

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105612OpenAlexW3165672573MaRDI QIDQ2685869

Benjamin Hébert, Michael Woodford

Publication date: 23 February 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105612

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionrational inattentionDDM models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (2)

Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition ⋮ Optimal learning before choice

Cites Work

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• On the Optimality of Conditional Expectation as a Bregman Predictor
• User’s guide to viscosity solutions of second order partial differential equations
• The Optimal Level of Experimentation
• Rational Inattention Dynamics: Inertia and Delay in Decision-Making
• Elements of Information Theory
• The First Passage Problem for a Continuous Markov Process

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