Monopoly insurance under adverse selection when agents differ in risk aversion
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Publication:1332706
DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1048zbMath0806.90024OpenAlexW1573288457MaRDI QIDQ1332706
Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson
Publication date: 19 February 1995
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1048
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
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