Monopoly insurance under adverse selection when agents differ in risk aversion

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1048zbMATH Open0806.90024OpenAlexW1573288457MaRDI QIDQ1332706FDOQ1332706

Authors: Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson 

Publication date: 19 February 1995

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1048

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zbMATH Keywords

insurance contractsmonopolistic insurertwo types of risk averse agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (9)

• Bowley Insurance with Expected Utility Maximization of the Policyholders
• Optimal reinsurance design with distortion risk measures and asymmetric information
• Extraction of surplus under adverse selection: The case of insurance markets
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• Life insurance settlement and the monopolistic insurance market
• Pricing high-risk and low-risk insurance contracts with incomplete information and production costs
• Monopoly insurance and endogenous information
• Insurance with heterogeneous preferences
• Optimal insurance with adverse selection

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