Monopoly insurance under adverse selection when agents differ in risk aversion

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1048MaRDI QIDQ1332706zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson

Publication date 19 February 1995

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1048

zbMATH Keywords

insurance contractsmonopolistic insurertwo types of risk averse agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cited in

(9)

• Bowley Insurance with Expected Utility Maximization of the Policyholders
• Optimal reinsurance design with distortion risk measures and asymmetric information
• Extraction of surplus under adverse selection: The case of insurance markets
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• Life insurance settlement and the monopolistic insurance market
• Pricing high-risk and low-risk insurance contracts with incomplete information and production costs
• Monopoly insurance and endogenous information
• Insurance with heterogeneous preferences
• Optimal insurance with adverse selection

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