Optimal insurance with adverse selection

DOI10.3982/TE671MaRDI QIDQ4586112zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hector Chade, Edward E. Schlee

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE671

zbMATH Keywords

common valuesempirical tests for adverse selectionmonopoly insuranceprincipal-agent modelquantity discountswealth effects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cited in

(29)

• Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection
• A general model of insurance under adverse selection
• Monopoly insurance under adverse selection when agents differ in risk aversion
• Adverse selection under ignorance
• Optimal insurance design with a bonus
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
• Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
• Insurance, adverse selection, and cream-skimming
• Extraction of surplus under adverse selection: The case of insurance markets
• The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making
• Information design in competitive insurance markets
• Insurance with heterogeneous preferences
• Corrigendum to: ``Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions
• Revisiting the optimal insurance design under adverse selection: distortion risk measures and tail-risk overestimation
• Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling
• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
• Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection
• Optimal insurance in a changing economy
• Insurance contracts and financial markets
• The pricing of optimal insurance policies
• Optimal reinsurance design with distortion risk measures and asymmetric information
• Reinsurance contract design with adverse selection
• Premium risk and managed care
• REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
• An adaptive strategy for offering m-out-of-n insurance policies
• A duality and free boundary approach to adverse selection
• Optimal insurance with information asymmetry: nonlinear and linear pricing
• Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification

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