Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
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Recommendations
Cited in
(11)- A general model of insurance under adverse selection
- Monopoly insurance under adverse selection when agents differ in risk aversion
- Price discrimination with loss averse consumers
- Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection
- Pessimistic information gathering
- Competitive insurance market in the presence of ambiguity
- An economical acceptance-rejection algorithm for uniform random variate generation over constrained simplexes
- Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion
- Study of insurance contract model with cash deposit based on ex-ante asymmetric information
- Arrow's theorem of the deductible with heterogeneous beliefs
- On Hurwicz preferences in psychological games
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