Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
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Publication:1398323
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00021-0zbMath1042.91023MaRDI QIDQ1398323
Publication date: 29 July 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (14)
A characterization of the \(n\)-agent Pareto dominance relation ⋮ Partial knowledge restrictions on the two-stage threshold model of choice ⋮ Testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individualrationality ⋮ A theory of reference-dependent behavior ⋮ Testable implications of coalitional rationality ⋮ Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games ⋮ A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems ⋮ Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification. ⋮ Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias ⋮ Existence of an upper hemi-continuous and convex-valued demand sub-correspondence ⋮ Rational choice with status quo bias ⋮ Revealed incomplete preferences under status-quo bias ⋮ A general extension result with applications to convexity, homotheticity and monotonicity ⋮ On reference dependent shortlisting behavior
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