Testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individualrationality
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Publication:852311
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0026-xzbMath1120.91023OpenAlexW2020032971MaRDI QIDQ852311
Publication date: 29 November 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0026-x
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