Testable implications of coalitional rationality

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.03.046MaRDI QIDQ1929447zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ruediger Bachmann

Publication date 8 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.046

zbMATH Keywords

allocation datacorenon-parametric restrictionstestability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Testable implications of the core in TU market games
• The coalitional approach to core theory
• Core allocations and the dimension of the cone of efficiency price vectors
• Cores of dense exchange economies
• Semi-core equivalence

Cites work

• Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies.
• Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
• Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification.
• Rationalizing allocation data -- a nonparametric Walrasian theory when prices are absent or non-Walrasian
• Revealed Preferences and Differentiable Demand
• Testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individualrationality
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data

Cited in

(3)

• Testable implications of the core in TU market games
• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• Empirical welfare economics

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