Lattice structure of many-to-one stable matchings
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3461215
Recommendations
- Optimization in many-to-one two-sided matching market
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
Cited in
(7)- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- The stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- Optimization in many-to-one two-sided matching market
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
This page was built for publication: Lattice structure of many-to-one stable matchings
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3461215)