Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.10.002zbMATH Open1206.91015OpenAlexW2091695747MaRDI QIDQ617690FDOQ617690
Authors: Jacco J. J. Thijssen
Publication date: 13 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.002
Recommendations
2-person games (91A05) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Games of timing (91A55)
Cites Work
Cited In (13)
- Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics
- Developing real option game models
- Investment under uncertainty, competition and regulation
- Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models
- On the investment-uncertainty relationship in a real option model with stochastic volatility
- Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
- Preemption with a second-mover advantage
- Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing
- Competitive real options under private information
- Investment timing and capacity decisions with time-to-build in a duopoly market
- Strategic investment with positive externalities
- Fear of the market or fear of the competitor? Ambiguity in a real options game
- Strategic investment under incomplete information
This page was built for publication: Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q617690)