Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty
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(13)- Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics
- Developing real option game models
- Investment under uncertainty, competition and regulation
- Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models
- On the investment-uncertainty relationship in a real option model with stochastic volatility
- Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
- Preemption with a second-mover advantage
- Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing
- Competitive real options under private information
- Investment timing and capacity decisions with time-to-build in a duopoly market
- Strategic investment with positive externalities
- Fear of the market or fear of the competitor? Ambiguity in a real options game
- Strategic investment under incomplete information
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