Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.002zbMath1206.91015OpenAlexW2091695747MaRDI QIDQ617690

Jacco J. J. Thijssen

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

preemptiontiming gamesrent equilizationstochastic shock

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Games of timing (91A55)

Related Items

Developing real option game models ⋮ On the investment-uncertainty relationship in a real option model with stochastic volatility ⋮ Strategic investment with positive externalities ⋮ Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models ⋮ Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing ⋮ Investment timing and capacity decisions with time-to-build in a duopoly market ⋮ Competitive real options under private information ⋮ Strategic investment under incomplete information ⋮ Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty ⋮ Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics ⋮ Investment under uncertainty, competition and regulation

Cites Work

• Irreversible investment and discounting: an arbitrage pricing approach
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology

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