Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0163-1MaRDI QIDQ257014zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bruno Versaevel

Publication date 15 March 2016

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0163-1

zbMATH Keywords

alertnessentryfirst-mover advantagepreemption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games of timing (91A55) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
• Real options and signaling in strategic investment games
• Priority option: the value of being a leader
• Investment timing decisions in a stochastic duopoly model
• Hiding and herding in market entry

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6016021 (Why is no real title available?)
• Catching the Wave: Alertness, Responsiveness, and Market Influence in Global Electronic Networks
• Caveat preemptor: coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game
• Developing real option game models
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Game theory
• Investment timing and learning externalities
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
• Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
• Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty
• Real options and preemption under incomplete information
• Strategic investment under uncertainty: a synthesis
• Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models
• The value of switching costs
• When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide

This page was built for publication: Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q257014)