Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0163-1zbMATH Open1348.91115OpenAlexW3122483731MaRDI QIDQ257014FDOQ257014

Authors: Bruno Versaevel 

Publication date: 15 March 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0163-1

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zbMATH Keywords

alertnessentryfirst-mover advantagepreemption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games of timing (91A55) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Real options and preemption under incomplete information
• Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
• The value of switching costs
• Game theory
• Developing real option game models
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide
• Caveat preemptor: coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Strategic investment under uncertainty: a synthesis
• Catching the Wave: Alertness, Responsiveness, and Market Influence in Global Electronic Networks
• Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models
• Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty
• Investment timing and learning externalities

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