Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics

DOI10.1007/s13235-015-0163-1zbMath1348.91115OpenAlexW3122483731MaRDI QIDQ257014

Bruno Versaevel

Publication date: 15 March 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0163-1

zbMATH Keywords

entryalertnessfirst-mover advantagepreemption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Games of timing (91A55)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Developing real option game models
• Caveat preemptor: coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game
• Strategic investment under uncertainty: a synthesis
• Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models
• Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty
• Investment timing and learning externalities
• Real options and preemption under incomplete information
• Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
• The value of switching costs
• When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Catching the Wave: Alertness, Responsiveness, and Market Influence in Global Electronic Networks

This page was built for publication: Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics