Caveat preemptor: coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.10.034zbMATH Open1268.91076OpenAlexW2086017554MaRDI QIDQ356576FDOQ356576

Bruno Versaevel, Etienne Billette De Villemeur, Richard Ruble

Publication date: 26 July 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.034

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zbMATH Keywords

real optionsinvestment valuationpre-emption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology

Cited In (3)

• Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics
• The Effect of Vertical Relationships on Investment Timing
• Strategic investment with positive externalities

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