Caveat preemptor: coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.10.034MaRDI QIDQ356576zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Etienne Billette De Villemeur, Richard Ruble, Bruno Versaevel

Publication date 26 July 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.034

zbMATH Keywords

investment valuationpre-emptionreal options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• A duopoly preemption game with two alternative stochastic investment choices
• Investment under uncertainty, competition and regulation
• Preemptive investment under uncertainty
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5287156
• Investment timing and learning externalities

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6016021 (Why is no real title available?)
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology

Cited in

(5)

• Investment coordination and demand complementarities
• Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics
• Strategic investment with positive externalities
• The effect of vertical relationships on investment timing
• Investments under strategic competition and uncertainty: a literature review on real option games

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