Stopping with congestion and private payoffs

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.08.001MaRDI QIDQ2222208zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Caroline D. Thomas

Publication date 26 January 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

congestiondynamic signallingexponential banditsprivate payoffsstopping gamestrategic experimentation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Games of timing (91A55)

Recommendations

• On games of strategic experimentation
• Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
• Strategic Experimentation

Cites work

• Breakdowns
• On games of strategic experimentation
• Potential competition in preemption games
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
• Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
• Preemption Games with Private Information
• Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems
• Strategic Experimentation
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models

Cited in

(4)

• Mutual observability and the convergence of actions in a multi-person two-armed bandit model
• Super- and submodularity of stopping games with random observations
• Strategic investment and learning with private information
• Learning and information aggregation in an exit game

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