Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: Must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales?

DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0558-6MaRDI QIDQ663200zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Elinor Ostrom

Publication date 14 February 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0558-6

zbMATH Keywords

climate policycollective-action theoryglobal public goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• Capital growth in a global warming model: Will China and India sign a climate treaty?
• Carbon leakages: a general equilibrium view
• Detrimental externalities, pollution rights, and the ``Coase theorem
• Global warming and economic externalities
• Intergenerational equity, efficiency, and constructibility
• Sustainable exploitation of a natural resource: a satisfying use of Chichilnisky's criterion
• Sustainable markets with short sales
• Sustainable recursive social welfare functions
• Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information
• Unspoken ethical issues in the climate affair: insights from a theoretical analysis of negotiation mandates
• Who should abate carbon emissions? An international viewpoint

Cited in

(9)

• Capital growth in a global warming model: Will China and India sign a climate treaty?
• Global warming and economic externalities
• Sustainable recursive social welfare functions
• Sustainable exploitation of a natural resource: a satisfying use of Chichilnisky's criterion
• Intergenerational equity, efficiency, and constructibility
• Economic theory and the global environment
• Carbon leakages: a general equilibrium view
• Unspoken ethical issues in the climate affair: insights from a theoretical analysis of negotiation mandates
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight

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