Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: Must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales?
DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0558-6zbMATH Open1276.91086OpenAlexW4242903505WikidataQ121373440 ScholiaQ121373440MaRDI QIDQ663200FDOQ663200
Authors: Elinor Ostrom 
Publication date: 14 February 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0558-6
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Cites Work
- Sustainable exploitation of a natural resource: a satisfying use of Chichilnisky's criterion
- Intergenerational equity, efficiency, and constructibility
- Sustainable markets with short sales
- Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information
- Capital growth in a global warming model: Will China and India sign a climate treaty?
- Global warming and economic externalities
- Sustainable recursive social welfare functions
- Who should abate carbon emissions? An international viewpoint
- Carbon leakages: a general equilibrium view
- Detrimental externalities, pollution rights, and the ``Coase theorem
- Unspoken ethical issues in the climate affair: insights from a theoretical analysis of negotiation mandates
Cited In (9)
- Capital growth in a global warming model: Will China and India sign a climate treaty?
- Global warming and economic externalities
- Sustainable recursive social welfare functions
- Sustainable exploitation of a natural resource: a satisfying use of Chichilnisky's criterion
- Intergenerational equity, efficiency, and constructibility
- Economic theory and the global environment
- Carbon leakages: a general equilibrium view
- Unspoken ethical issues in the climate affair: insights from a theoretical analysis of negotiation mandates
- International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
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