CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000417MaRDI QIDQ5694438zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Laurence Kranich, Andres Perea, Hans Peters

Publication date 30 September 2005

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000417

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Dynamic games (91A25)

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Cites work

• A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Monotonicity of solutions in certain dynamic cooperative games
• Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games
• Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The Recursive Core
• The core of a monetary economy without trust
• The strong sequential core for two-period economies

Cited in

(36)

• Cores and generalized NM-solutions for some classes of cooperative games
• On the regularization of a cooperative solution in a multistage game with random time horizon
• Strong time-consistent core for a class of linear-state games
• Strategic transfers between cooperative games
• On the core of dynamic cooperative games
• A dynamic game of waste management
• Optimal deterrence of cooperation
• Dynamic cost allocation for economic lot sizing games
• The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy
• A note on the weak sequential core of dynamic TU games
• The core of a repeated \(n\)-person cooperative game
• Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
• The weak sequential core for two-period economies
• Strongly time-consistent core in differential games with discrete distribution of random time horizon
• An overview on game theory applications to engineering
• The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
• Sequential stochastic core of a cooperative stochastic programming game
• Transferable utility games with uncertainty
• Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games
• An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
• Sustaining cooperation in a differential game of advertising goodwill accumulation
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• Deviations, uncertainty and the core
• Confidence intervals for the Shapley-Shubik power index in Markovian games
• DYNAMIC COOPERATIVE GAMES
• On robustness and dynamics in (un)balanced coalitional games
• Robust dynamic cooperative games
• A dynamic process to the core for multi-choice games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202821 (Why is no real title available?)
• Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective
• Core concepts for incomplete market economies
• Stochastic bankruptcy games
• Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games
• The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty
• The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
• Dynamic linear programming games with risk-averse players

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