A friendly computable characteristic function

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.03.008zbMath1397.91048OpenAlexW2339348728MaRDI QIDQ309838

Georges Zaccour, Puduru Viswanadha Reddy

Publication date: 7 September 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

\(\delta\)-core\(\gamma\)-core\(n\)-player gamecoalitional formcomputable characteristic function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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Solution of Differential Games with Network Structure in Marketing ⋮ Payoff distribution in a multi-company extraction game with uncertain duration ⋮ Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games ⋮ Node-consistent Shapley value for games played over event trees with random terminal time ⋮ On the symmetry relation between different characteristic functions for additively separable cooperative games ⋮ A substitute for the classical Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function in cooperative differential games ⋮ Stochastic model of network formation with asymmetric players ⋮ Strong Subgame Consistency of the Core in Stochastic Network Formation Games ⋮ The Shapley Value as a Sustainable Cooperative Solution in Differential Games of Three Players ⋮ Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability ⋮ Cooperative differential games with continuous updating using Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation

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• N‐person games in partition function form

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