Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction

DOI10.1111/SJOE.12164MaRDI QIDQ4683591zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Olivier Bos, Beatrice Roussillon, Paul Schweinzer

Publication date 21 September 2018

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/88389/1/aeer_05.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

agreementsclimate policycontests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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(3)

• On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements
• Global refunding and climate change
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5007560 (Why is no real title available?)

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