Continuous-time strategy selection in linear population games

DOI10.1023/A:1009977715310MaRDI QIDQ1971052zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Claudia Keser

Publication date 22 March 2000

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsincomplete informationcontinuous-time games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

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(4)

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• From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
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• Strategy selection in structured populations

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